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LOAN MODIFICATIONS: TURBULENT TIMES -
TROUBLESOME TOPICS
J. THOMAS DUNN, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Periods of turbulent times in financial markets and the
United States economy dramatically increase the need for changes
in existing credit relationships. During these vexing times, lenders
reevaluate their customers and their portfolios and adjust their
conduct to implement revised goals. Reflecting these adjustments
is the practice of modifying the credit documents which support
those relationships. These modifications might be relatively
simple and straightforward in an ordinary economy, but
extraordinary times create an environment ripe for difficulties,
complications, and even problematic conduct under civil and
criminal laws.
In 2008, credit markets froze, banks failed, the United
States economy fell sharply, consumer real estate foreclosures rose
to record highs, consumer and business confidence was eroded,
and commercial, industrial and real estate borrowers suffered
severely depressed markets. In short, adverse economic
conditions precipitated a market of noncomplementary needs
between borrowers and lenders, and between regulators, who were
enforcing standards imperfectly suited to the circumstances, and
their regulated lenders, who were struggling to survive the
downturn. In this environment, bankers, borrowers, regulators
and their advisors faced unfamiliar difficulties in finding common
grounds of understanding and commonly acceptable tools to deal
with the existent circumstances.
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The purpose of this article is to examine some of the
necessarily troubling topics and the challenging issues inherent in
the exploration of mutually acceptable solutions. Section II of this
article explores the appropriateness of certain modifications within
the context of both business and regulatory topics. Section III
illustrates legal issues, both technical and practical, that are
inherent in loan modifications Section IV discusses insolvency
issues in loan modifications, and section V examines the practice
of drafting loan modifications.3
II. APPROPRIATENESS OF MODIFICATIONS - BUSINESS AND
REGULATORY TOPICS
A. Business Topics
Clear minded analysis and clearly communicated policies
and careful policy enforcement, must accompany loan
modifications and related loan document modifications to ensure
they are appropriate under relevant regulatory rules and risk
underwriting customs. Modifications may be appropriate to keep
or reward a desirable customer by providing less restrictive
covenant resets, maturity extensions, and performance related
pricing or more competitive pricing. Modifications may also be
necessary to move an undesirable customer "out of the bank" by
adding more restrictive covenant resets, shortening maturities,
increasing interest rates or fees, and decreasing advance rates.
Finally, a modification's motivation may be to improve the bank's
position in a troubled credit relationship, such as obtaining
collateral or other credit support, correcting documentation or lien
deficiencies, adding cross collateralization and cross default
provisions, and adding specificity or additional elements as events
of default so as to strengthen the bank's right to remedy
enforcement.
Loan modifications may also be used during market
disruptions such as periods of abnormally high interest rates (e.g.,
1. See infra Section II.
2. See infra Section III.
3. See infra Sections IV and V.
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prime rates in the twenty percent range in the early 1980s), real
estate related downturns, capital conservation periods, and periods
of increased bank failures, such as we saw in 2008. This use,
although often appropriate, tends to elicit customer resistance,
create negative publicity for the bank, and spawn litigation. Also,
when Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
receiverships occur for failed banks during such periods, the FDIC
customarily chooses another bank to administer the troubled loans
created by the failed bank and the administering bank then advises
the FDIC as receiver to avoid the executory obligations of the
failed bank regarding those troubled loans. Under these
circumstances, litigation costs from lender liability lawsuits tend to
increase and customer resistance to voluntary modifications
naturally tends to become pronounced and widespread. So, while
the use of modifications is not necessarily inappropriate in these
situations, there tends to be an additional cost associated with their
use in terms of the time involved, the legal costs, and the market
perception of the lenders.
B. Regulatory Topics
Difficult times also tend to create an environment
conducive to some banks resorting to inappropriate uses of
modifications. When customers cannot pay as agreed, overly
optimistic bankers tend to resort to a practice of loan
modifications by either renewing loans with the capitalization of
unpaid interest or extending maturities with the use of side notes
to capitalize the unpaid interest. Such renewal or rollover of loans
causes a bank's records to reflect a loan as current and performing
when, in fact, it is not current and performing. This type of
modification may be a violation of federal and state criminal laws.
Guidance as to whether loans should be classified as performing
are in the FDIC Risk Management Manual of Examination
Policies, Section 3.2,4 the federal regulators' Uniform Retail Credit
4. While the FDIC's examination manual is principally designed to assist bank
examiners, it is also helpful to bankers, accountants and attorneys in evaluating a
bank's policies and procedures and anticipating regulatory reactions to the bank's
conduct. Although the entire Section 3.2 - Loans is important, for this specific issue,
particular attention is appropriate to those portions entitled Loan Review Systems,
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Classification and Account Management Policy,' Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards (FAS) No. 5 (FAS 5),6 FAS 15, 7
FAS 114,8 and the Interagency Policy Statement on the Allowance
for Loan and Lease Losses.9 These statutes, as well as many other
state and federal criminal laws, are designed to assure that the
books and records of the bank accurately reflect the condition of
Credit Grading Systems, Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses *ALLL), Factors to
Consider in Estimating Credit Losses and Accounting and Reporting Treatment.
5. This policy applies to open-end and closed-end consumer purpose credit and,
generally stated, requires classification of loans as substandard when 90 days past due
and Loss *and charged off) when 120 days past due for closed-end and 180 days past
due for open-end. Special detailed rules allow partial charge offs for secured credits.
6. FAS 5 requires an estimation and accrual of loss if (a) information is available
that indicates that it is probable that an asset is impaired and (b) the amount of the
loss can be reasonably estimated.
7. FAS 15 provides rules for accounting for troubled debt restructurings, e.g.,
receipt of assets in payment on the debt, conversion of debt to equity in a work out
and work out reductions in the amount of the debt or the interest thereon.
8. FAS 114 addresses less certain circumstances than the circumstances
necessary for a FAS 5 determination and provides that an individual loan is impaired
when based upon current information and events, it is probable that a lender will be
unable to collect all amounts due according to the terms of the credit documents.
Within that general framework, a creditor is to apply its normal loan review
procedures in making the judgment as to whether the loan is impaired or not, and if
impaired to what extent. The federal banking regulators have suggested that the bank
should consider the following in making its judgment: its "watch lists," its past due
reports, any lack of reliable or current information in the borrower's loan files,
whether the borrower's business is affected by troubled industries or geographical
areas, whether there is inadequate loan documentation and what exception reports
the bank has developed or received regarding the borrower.
9. The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) establishes
uniform examination related policies for the various federally regulated financial
institutions. Such policy statements are published by and constitute the uniform
policy of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Office of the
Comptroller of Currency and the National Credit Union Administration (these
interagency statements may be found on all of these agencies' respective websites).
This particular statement on the allowance for loan and lease losses (ALLL), which
was most recently modified in December of 2006, is designed to ensure uniformity
between the agencies as regards such losses and provide specific and practical
guidance regarding processes for determination of such loss impairments under FAS
5 and FAS 114. The policy emphasizes that such determination must be ongoing (no
less than quarterly) and must be a fundamental function of the financial institution's
loan review process. The policy recognizes that FAS 114 is typically used to analyze
impairment of individual loans and FAS 5 is typically used to analyze impairment of
groups of loans. It emphasizes, however, that even if a loan is not determined to be
impaired under FAS 114 it nonetheless should be evaluated under FAS 5 when
specific characteristics of the loan indicates that it is probable there would be
estimated credit losses in a group of loans with those characteristics (e.g., the
borrower is in a troubled industry or troubled geographical market).
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the bank so as to allow the bank's regulatory agency to assess its
financial condition and the safety and soundness of its operations.
Typically, these statutes are broadly applied to deviations from
complete transparency. Obvious violations include loan officers
making false entries on currency transaction reports for cash
payments on loans. Somewhat less obvious violations include
accepting and filing in the bank's records incorrect loan purpose
statements or inflated financial statements from borrowers,
permitting borrowers to omit material information on loan
applications, allowing inspectors to incorrectly certify completion
of phases of construction work, and sanctioning the use of invalid
comparables to increase appraised values of collateral.
As an additional level of protection for the bank's safety
and soundness and accuracy of its records, a bank is responsible
for filing a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) to the Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) whenever it detects a
known or suspected violation of federal law.1° Bank management
must also notify the bank's board of directors, and the board, in
turn, must record such notification in its minutes, thus providing
for another vehicle for bank regulators to detect possible criminal
violations.
There are many other circumstances where a lack of
transparency may result in criminal liability. One example is if the
loan officer makes a loan to a third party to pay off the troubled
loan to an existing borrower without conspicuously disclosing all
material facts on the bank's loan records and without disclosing
those facts to the bank's regulators in the response to the Officer's
Questionnaire required in the bank's regular safety and soundness
examination process. The Officer's Questionnaire is used by
federal banking examiners and many state examiners and must be
completed by the bank's management and delivered to the
regulator's examination team immediately prior to the bank's
periodic Safety and Soundness examinations. The first question in
the Officer's Questionnaire calls for disclosures of renewals and
extensions of credit where the full interest has not been paid,
10. See Suspicious Activity Report, 12 C.F.R. 21.11 (2009) regarding national
banks; other financial institutions are subject to practically identical rules for their
operations.
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where side notes are taken for interest, and where interest has
been capitalized. 1 Failure to accurately make such disclosures
exposes the certifying bank officers to criminal penalties.
Another example of the requirement for transparency is
Question 3 of the Officer's Questionnaire which asks for disclosure
of "extensions of credit made for the accommodation or direct
benefit of anyone other than those whose names appear either on
the note or other related credit instruments."12 Historically, this
question was first focused on money laundering activities, but now
it applies in practice to anything that falls within its very broad
language. The regulators apply it, for example, to a business
associate borrowing money in his or her own name but "on loan"
to an associate in an unrelated enterprise. By a literal reading of
its terms, it applies to a natural person borrowing money for an
uncreditworthy relative, even a mother borrowing funds for her
son to go to graduate school. Failure to disclose all such loans
which are known or reasonably should be known to fall within
these parameters subjects the certifying officer to the criminal
liability. From a practical perspective this is particularly
troublesome since circumstances falling within the broad language
are not rare, and the required disclosures are rarely made
particularly in consumer and community banking contexts.
Therefore, it is plausible that many chief executive officers may
unwittingly make false certifications which subject them to felony
prosecution.
All aspects of the needs for transparency and full
disclosures should receive particular attention in this time of
troubled financial markets. The numerous examples of criminal
11. "Question 1. List all extensions of credit and their corresponding balances
which, since the last FDIC examination, have been renewed or extended under any
of the following circumstances: (a) without full connection of interest due (b) with
acceptance of separate notes for the payment of interest (c) with capitalization of
interest to the balance of the note."
12. "Question 3. For all listed loans, state which situation applies. Consumer
credit/installment loans may be aggregated by number and total dollar volume. List
all extensions of credit made for the accommodation or direct benefit of anyone
other than those whose names appear either on the note or on other related credit
instruments. Only include extensions of credit made since the previous FDIC
examination. Indicate if any executive officer, principal shareholder, director, or
their related interest (per Federal Reserve Board Regulation 0 definitions) is or was
involved."
[Vol. 13
LOAN MODIFICATIONS
prosecution during and after the S & L Crisis of the 1980s and
early 1990s should be sufficient evidence of the risks inherent in
these times.
C. FDIC Call Report Topic Related to Troubled Credits
In periods of uncertainty and turbulence in the financial
market, it is important to highlight a related regulatory issue.
Because of market turmoil, many financial institutions face the
highly difficult tasks of valuing their assets and establishing
appropriate loan loss reserves. For some community banks in
particular, these tasks have exceeded their internal controls and
the resulting recognition of material weaknesses in these controls
has prevented the timely filing of applicable SEC reports by the
banks or their holding companies. The SEC and Nasdaq reporting
procedures anticipate such contingencies and permit late filings to
occur without the imposition of penalties under very specific
conditions.13  On the other hand, the regulatory procedures
regarding the FDIC Call Reports have no such process for delayed
filings, or filing Call Reports without certifying to their accuracy.
A false certification of a Call Report subjects the certifying CEO
and board to exposure to felony charges under the federal criminal
statutes referenced earlier. Under the current published
instructions, the Call Report must be timely filed and certified or
the institution faces the exposure to over a million dollars in
penalties. On the other hand, if the Call Report is filed containing
knowingly incorrect information to which the CEO and board
certify is accurate, such filing subjects the institution to exposure to
over a million dollars in penalties and subjects its certifying officer
and directors to personal felony charges. 4 So whether it is not
filed because it cannot be truthfully certified as correct, or it is
filed and certified with incorrect information, penalties may be
enforced.
13. See, e.g., NASDAQ, Inc., Nasdaq Manual Marketplace Rule 4310(c)(14)
(2007).
14. See 12 C.F.R. § 308.132 (2008).
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IIl. LEGAL ToPics INHERENT IN LOAN MODIFICATIONS
There are numerous technical and practical issues involved
in loan modifications. Some of the common ones will be
addressed here. Of course, as is the case with many loan-related
risks, the risks inherent between the bank and its customer in a
loan modification normally only become a financial risk if the loan
becomes a problem asset.
A. Novation
Novation is a common law concept where one contract is
legally extinguished and replaced by another contract."i Normally,
the practical risk in a novation is that a party to the contract may
unintentionally lose the benefits of a related agreement. For
example, if one note is found to be a novation of prior note then,
absent agreement to the contrary, a co-maker on the first note who
is not a co-maker on the "novation note" is for practical purposes
"released" in that his contractual obligations are extinguished.16
The same result would be true if a guarantor of the first note did
not sign the novation note, or if a security agreement or mortgage
securing the first note was not modified to secure the novation
note." Novation is a contract principle, and like most contract
principles, whether the loan modification is a novation or not
depends upon the intent of the parties with the fact finder first
directed to available written evidence. 8 Therefore, if it is stated in
a loan modification document that it is not a novation, then as to
the parties who executed it, it is, absent extraordinary
circumstances, not a novation. Similarly, if the original guaranty,
security agreement, or mortgage between the parties states that
such document is to guaranty or secure, as the case may be,
subsequent loan modifications, then that intent, absent a new
assent, will be deemed to apply in the vast majority of
circumstances and a novation will not arise. 9
15. See generally 66 C.J.S. Novation § 2 (2008).
16. See 66 C.J.S. Novation § 18 (2008).
17. See U.C.C. § 3-605(f) (2002).
18. See 66 C.J.S. Novation § 14 (2008).
19. See 66 C.J.S. Novation § 23; U.C.C. § 3-605(i) (2002).
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B. Impact on Other Agreements
Other related contracts, such as title insurance contracts
and account control agreements, may be affected by a
modification whether any of those related contracts need to be
revised or updated should be determined. It is important to
ascertain what all related contracts contain before any changes are
made to any contract. This is particularly significant when drafting
a modification of a document which was originally prepared by
another drafter, whether the original contract was done for the
particular transaction by another lawyer or it happens to be one of
the preprinted form contracts which are often used by community
banks. There is danger in any assumptions regarding any content
of these other documents with which the attorney may be less
familiar. This is especially critical where collateral may be subject
to the laws of other states where there may be a need to comply
with any "unusual features" of local and industry specific laws.
Finally, in any club deal or syndicated credit, each bank
needs to revisit the existing contractual provisions regarding the
lead or agent bank's duties and its rights regarding modifications,
as well as the pertinent provisions regarding "Required Lenders"
and any situations where consents may be required from
supermajority lenders or all lenders.
C. Loan Participations
A loan participation may be construed as either a sale of an
undivided interest in a loan by the participating bank, which
transfers all beneficial and economic interests in the underlying
loan leaving the seller with only bare legal title, or a loan from the
participant bank to the participating bank. Whether the
participation is construed on a sale or a loan depends upon the
intent of the parties and the wording of the particular participation
agreement. Of course, if the transaction is classified as a loan and
the participant bank does not have a perfected security interest in
the underlying loan or other collateral then the participant is an
unsecured creditor allowing only general claimant rights against
the bank originating the loan in any FDIC receivership of the
2009]
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originating bank. All participation agreements should be
examined for clarity on this issue and, to the extent the agreement
is not clear, modified to achieve such clarity. Obviously, such
modifications need to be timely done so as to avoid, to the extent
possible, claims by the FDIC that the modification constitutes a
20fraudulent conveyance.
D. Revisitation of Original Analysis
A loan modification presents an opportunity to reflect
upon the borrower's current circumstances in the context of
existing documentation and filings to see if any changes or
improvements are appropriate. This is particularly critical if the
purpose of a loan modification is to prepare to move an
undesirable customer out of the bank or when beginning an
analysis of enforcement against the debtor in the event of a
default.
In any pre-workout or troubled relationship analysis all
documents should be reviewed for any shortcomings or
discrepancies. Have all documents been properly executed? Have
all blanks been filled in, particularly when form or preprinted
documents have been used or where blanks were provided in
execution versions to be filled in at the closing table? Has
possessory collateral been received and does the security
agreement accurately reflect that collateral? Have control
agreements for security accounts and deposit accounts been
received? Were all appropriate lockboxes set up and is cash
dominion in place? Have applicable lien waivers been executed
and received regarding warehousemen, storage facilities, carriers,
landlords, contractors, architects, and similar third party rights?
Are access rights in place to timber tracts, wellheads, and mines?
Are mineral leases properly assigned? Are state and federal
assignment of claims properly executed and recorded? Have
intangible and documentary taxes been paid where failure to do so
would impede or prohibit lien enforcement (e.g., Florida and
20. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a) (2006). This issue is more fully discussed in the FIRREA
analysis below.
206 [Vol. 13
LOAN MODIFICA TIONS
Georgia collateral)? 2  Are trademark and copyright liens
perfected on primary collateral and are enforcement rights
practically contracted for on packaging? Are sale and distribution
rights secured for labeled goods? Should account debtor
notification rights be exercised in an accounts receivable
financing? Should new field audits be ordered? Is the lender
properly qualified to do business in any jurisdiction necessary for
effective lien enforcement, especially if the jurisdiction regards
lending functions as doing business?22 Is the state law preempted
by federal laws under either the Commerce Clause or banking
laws for federally chartered entities?
2
.
Requirements for notices of default provided for and
necessary under the loan documents or required by law should
also be reviewed. Notices of default under notes and enforcement
of attorneys' fees are customarily required in the documents and
sometimes required by law24 as are notices of proposed sales or
collateral. 25 These provisions are not normally considered to be
subject to waiver in the original loan agreements and most
practitioners comply with the statutory provisions rather than rely
upon post-default waivers or modification agreements which
contain such waivers.
As previously mentioned, a study should be performed for
any unusual local laws. For instance in North Carolina there is an
unusual statutory provision regarding guarantors and sureties.
Under North Carolina law, once an obligation is "due and
payable" a surety of that obligation, including endorser or
guarantor, may give a written notice to the holder of the obligation
that requires the lender to "use all reasonable diligence to recover
against the principal and to proceed to realize upon any securities
which he holds for the obligation., 26 If the lender fails to comply
with this demand within thirty days from receipt of the notice, then
all sureties prejudiced thereby are discharged from their
21. See American First Fed. v. Lake Forest Park, Inc., 198 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir.
1999).
22. See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 50003(g)(1) (2001).
23. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 34; see also 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4008, 7.4009 (2007).
24. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21.2 (2007),
25. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-613 (2007).
26. N.C. GEN STAT. § 26-7(a) (2007).
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obligations under the note.27 The law provides that even if the
note contains a waiver of any defense of the surety to an extension
of the time for payment of the note, that waiver does not prevent
the operation of this statutory provision to discharge the surety's
28
obligation. It is significant that the statute only says that waivers
of surety defenses based upon extensions of time for payment do
not prevent the operation of the surety discharge provision under
the statute. The statute does not address other waivers and it is
customary, therefore in commercial bank guaranty agreements for
an explicit waiver of Section 26.7 of the North Carolina General
Statutes. In most preprinted form guarantees, however, such an
explicit waiver does not appear. Any modification involving a
distressed credit under North Carolina law should carefully
evaluate the appropriateness of requiring a waiver by all
guarantors or sureties of the provisions of the North Carolina
Statute.
IV. INSOLVENCY TOPICS INHERENT IN LOAN MODIFICATIONS
If any deficiencies or shortcomings appear in an analysis of
the loan documents or if the modification is to improve the credit
support and the borrower's or guarantor's condition is distressed,
it is critical that an insolvency analysis also be performed. To
properly analyze the ramifications of a possible insolvency
proceeding, it is critical not only to understand the various
provisions of the insolvency laws, but also to determine which
body of insolvency law is applicable to the circumstances since
different outcomes may result from the modification depending on
the type of debtor involved.
A. Bankruptcy Analysis - "Corporate" Debtors
There are several bankruptcy law provisions applicable to
general business entities and individuals which must receive
particular attention in modifications. While this analysis is
particularly important for problem credits, it is also important in
27. N.C. GEN STAT. § 26-9 (2007).
28. N.C. GEN STAT. § 26-9(b).
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the context of any credit. The most significant bankruptcy
29provisions are the preference section, the fraudulent conveyance
section,3 ° and the equitable subordination section.
A preference under Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code is
a transfer of any property rights of the debtor to or for the benefit
of the creditor within ninety days of the filing of a bankruptcy
petition or within one year if the creditor is an insider of the
debtor.32 Such a transfer may be avoided if it prefers the creditor
by permitting it to receive more than it would have without the
transfer in a hypothetical Chapter 7 bankruptcy liquidation of the
debtor. A common litigation strategy used by bankruptcy trustees
and debtors in bankruptcy is to attempt to extend the preference
period beyond the ninety day period by arguing that the creditor
exercised control over the debtor and thus was an insider so that
the reach-back period is extended to a year.33 A preference action
is common for a bankruptcy trustee when a modification results in
additional collateral being given by the debtor or the loan is paid
down or paid off.
Fraudulent transfer attacks under Section 548 are based
upon the notion that a transferor such as a debtor did not receive
reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer and was
or became insolvent by virtue of the transfer, or had unreasonably
small capital remaining after the transfer.34 The reach back period
here extends to transfers made in the one year period preceding
the debtor's bankruptcy, but debtors often argue for state law
fraudulent conveyance law application if the transfer occurred
outside the year and the applicable state law reach back period is
longer. A bankruptcy trustee often asserts a fraudulent
conveyance action against the creditor if a modification results in a
new guarantor or if new collateral is provided by an affiliate of the
borrower.
29. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2006).
30. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2006).
31. 11 U.S.C. § 510 (2006).
32. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2006).
33. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (defining an insider as one who exercises control over
the debtor).
34. 11 U.S.C. § 548.
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Equitable subordination claims are essentially common law
claims recognized in principle in Section 510 of the Bankruptcy
Code to subordinate the creditor's claim to other claims or classes
of claims in the bankruptcy proceeding. This provision is often at
issue if the creditor has exercised considerable influence over the
borrower to the disadvantage of other creditors or stakeholders.
An experienced bankruptcy attorney should carefully
evaluate these Bankruptcy Code provisions in the context of any
loan modification where the debtor is in distress so as to best
structure and document the modification to withstand these
potential challenges. While some bankruptcy practitioners
advocate contracting away certain bankruptcy protections in any
modification, the creditor can normally take little assurance that a
bankruptcy court will enforce such waivers."
B. FIRREA Analysis - Bank Debtors
If the borrower is a bank holding company or a financial
holding company the bankruptcy provisions discussed above as
well as other bankruptcy laws and state insolvency laws apply to
the debtor as ordinary corporations. But, if the borrower is a
FDIC-insured bank, then the bankruptcy laws do not apply in its
insolvency proceeding. Instead, the FDIC has its own receivership
rules and procedures which govern claims against the failed bank.
Relevant bank insolvency provisions are discussed in some detail
here since there is less general familiarity with bank insolvency
laws than there is with general "corporate" bankruptcy laws.36
There is no preference concept under the FDIC insolvency
process comparable to the bankruptcy preference provision. The
FDIC may, however, assert its powers of avoidance under a
fraudulent conveyance rule to set aside claims, including security
interests in property, if the creditor took security interest in
contemplation of the bank's insolvency or with the intent to
35. See In re Atrium High Point Ltd. P'ship, 189 B.R. 599 (Bankr. M.D.N.C.
1995) for a North Carolina case discussing the competing issues relating to such
waivers.
36. See Peter P. Swire, Bank Insolvency Law Now That It Matters Again, 42
DUKE L.J. 469 (1992) for an excellent in-depth analysis of policy and legal issues of
bank insolvencies.
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hinder, delay, or defraud the bank or its other creditors. This
avoidance power can be applied to any transfer made within five
years before the appointment of a receiver and may be asserted by
the receiver for five years after its appointment."
The FDIC as the federal government's insurer of bank
deposits has a unique interest in assuring that bank records which
are subject to its regulatory examination and reporting, including
those quarterly statements of condition known as Call Reports,
accurately reflect the economic well being of banks and the true
state of affairs regarding the bank's relationships with its
customers, its lenders, and its suppliers. Therefore, the FDIC as
receiver may seek redress against bankers, customers, lenders, and
suppliers whose conduct has interfered with the transparency of
the bank's records. Several doctrines and statutes have arisen
from this principle and they are of exceptional importance in the
loan modification and insolvency contexts since they give the
FDIC as receiver powerful tools which are unavailable to
bankruptcy trustees.
1. D'Oench, Duhme Doctrine and § 1823(e) of FIRREA
The D'Oench, Duhme Doctrine arising from a 1942
Supreme Court case bearing the same name,38 stands for the
general principle that secret side agreements with banks for which
the FDIC has subsequently been appointed as receiver are
unenforceable against the receivership. Congress enacted the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950 which announced a similar,
but more specific, statutory protection than D'Oench, Duhme and
which was codified in § 1823(e) of title 12 of the U.S. Code. This
section was reenacted as part of the Garn - St. Germain
Depository Institution Act of 1982. In 1989, as part of the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act
(FIRREA), Congress reenacted § 1823(e) and specifically
expanded its coverage in several respects, including coverage to
the FDIC in its newly created receivership unit. The general
D'Oench, Duhme Doctrine may have survived the passage of the
37. 12 U.S.C. 1821(a)(17) (2008).
38. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
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FIRREA in 1989, or it may have been preempted by the more
specific provisions of § 1823(e) of FIRREA.3 9 While the D'Oench,
Duhme Doctrine empowered federal receivers of banks to rely
upon a common law theory of equitable estoppel to lawfully
disregard secret side agreements which are adverse to the interests
of the receivership, section 1823(e) goes much further and applies
to any claim or defense that does not strictly meet the four
statutory elements (1) the claim or defense must be based upon an
agreement which is in writing, (2) the writing was
39. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (2006). The current version of § 1823(e) reads in part as
follows:
(e) Agreements Against Interests of Corporation-
(1) In General
No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the
interest of the Corporation in any asset acquired by it
under this section or section 1821 of this title, either as
security for a loan or by purchase or as receiver of any
insured depository institution, shall be valid against the
Corporation unless such agreement-
(A) is in writing,
(B) was executed by the depository institution
and any person claiming an adverse interest
thereunder, including the obligor,
contemporaneously with the acquisition of the
asset by the depository institution,
(C) was approved by the board of directors of
the depository institution or its loan committee,
which approval shall be reflected in the minutes
of said board or committee, and
(D) has been, continuously, from time of its
execution, an official record of the depository
institution.
Congress added a new and related provision to § 1823(e) in FIRREA, which
now appears in 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(9)(A)(2006):
(9) Agreement as Basis of Claim.
(A) Requirements.
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), any
agreement which does not meet the
requirements set forth in section 1823(e) shall
not form the basis of, or substantially comprise,
a claim against the receiver or the Corporation.
Importantly, therefore, the coverage of and specificity required by 1823(e)
for protection from adverse claims as to "assets" of the receivership also applies to
"claims" which are unrelated to specific "assets" of the receivership.
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contemporaneously executed by the parties claiming thereunder,
(3) the agreement was approved by the bank's board of directors
or loan committee, and (4) the agreement has continuously
appeared in the bank's official records. Therefore, even good faith
failures to comply with § 1823(e) will not prevent its application to
cases by the FDIC. Conceptually, the statute is not designed so
much as to protect the bank since it is not applicable to solvent
banks as it is to protect the FDIC and therefore § 1823(e) assures
that claims and defenses adverse to a failed bank can only apply
against the FDIC as receiver if they satisfy § 1823(e), and thereby
were apparent in regulatory examinations of the bank in a pre-
receivership environment. Although the courts are not uniform on
the issue of survival or pre-emption, the FDIC contends that the
D'Oench, Duhme Doctrine continues to survive and that matters
not falling within the parameters of § 1823(e) may nonetheless still
be unenforceable.
2. Repudiation of Contracts by Receiver
Another unique power of the FDIC as receiver appears in §
1821(e)(1) and provides the FDIC the right to repudiate contracts
that it deems burdensome in an insolvency proceeding for an
insured bank.0 While the discretion of the FDIC is virtually
unlimited as to what is "burdensome" the effect of this power is
restricted to some degree in § 1821(e)(12) which limits the FDIC's
avoidance powers regarding security interest." Although these
40. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1) (2006). Section 1821(e)(1) reads as follows:
(1)Authority to Repudiate Contracts
In addition to any other rights a conservator or receiver may have,
the conservator or receiver for any insured depository institution
may disaffirm or repudiate any contract or lease-
(A) to which such institution is a party;
(B) the performance of which the conservator or
receiver, in the conservator's or receiver's discretion,
determines to be burdensome; and
(C) the disaffirmance or repudiation of which the
conservator or receiver determines, in the conservator's
or receiver's discretion, will promote the orderly
administration of the institution's affairs.
41. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(12). Section 1821(e)(12) reads:
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powers are only enforceable by the FDIC as receiver, it is
important to recognize that, as a practical matter, the typical
process works as follows: The bank's primary regulator - for
example, the Comptroller of Currency for national banks - is
responsible for the determination of the bank's insolvency. Should
the bank be found insolvent, the FDIC will be appointed as its
receiver. The FDIC has a number of options, but commonly the
FDIC will sell the deposits and "good loans" to another bank as
the highest bidder and the FDIC hires the same bank to administer
the "bad loans" of the failed bank. That administering bank will
analyze the individual loans and advise the FDIC which executory
obligations the FDIC should repudiate.
3. The Provability Doctrine
In 1996, the FDIC issued a Statement of Policy reaffirming
its policy of enforcing the statutory provisions regarding
repudiation and the avoidability of security interests. It then
cautioned, however, that it nonetheless retained the right to
redeem or repay any secured obligation by repudiation. In such
event, the FDIC postulates, subject to certain exceptions, that its
liability for exercising its repudiation rights (and thus the amount
of collateral value available to the insolvent bank's secured
creditor) is limited to "actual direct compensatory damages
determined as of the date of the appointment of the conservator or
receiver" and that such allowed damages do not include "punitive
or exemplary damages, damages for lost profits or opportunity or
damages for pain and suffering.,
42
(11) Certain Security Interests Not Avoidable
No provision of this subsection shall be construed as permitting the
avoidance or any legally enforceable or perfected security interest
in any of the assets of any depository institution except where such
an interest is taken in contemplation of the institution's insolvency
or with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the institution or the
creditors of such institution.
42. FDIC, Statement of Policy Regarding Treatment of Collateralized Letters of
Credit After Appointment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as
Conservator or Receiver, 60 Fed. Reg. 27,976 (May 19, 1995) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1821
(e)(3)(A) and (B)). Section 1821(e)(3) provides as follows:
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The FDIC stated in a 1993 Statement of Policy "therefore,
if the FDIC repudiates a legally enforceable and perfected security
agreement, it cannot avoid any legally enforceable and perfected
security interest in the collateral to the extent of the statutory
damages allowed.,
43
In order to determine the "extent of the statutory damages
allowed" one must analyze the appropriate standards to be used in
determining the allowance. The FDIC's current position and the
pre FIRREA law was that the damages must be "provable" i.e.,
"unconditionally fixed." Court cases regarding "provability,"
however, suggest a more flexible standard. These cases contend
that provable claims are those which (1) present a present cause of
action, (2) which are certain but not yet matured, or (3) are
contingent but the worth or amount can be determined by
recognized methods of computation at the applicable date."
(3) Claims for damages for repudiation
(A) In general
Except as otherwise provided in [section regarding
Qualified Financial Contracts (QFC's), leases and real
property sales], the liability of the conservator or receiver
for the disaffirmance or repudiation of any contract
pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be -
(i) limited to actual direct compensatory
damages; and
(ii) determined as of -
(I) the date of the appointment of the
conservator or receiver; or
(1I) in the case of any contract or agreement
referred to in [section regarding QFC's], the
date of the disaffirmance or repudiation of such
contract or agreement.
(B) No liability for other damages
For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term "actual direct compensatory
damages" does not include (i) punitive or exemplary damages; (ii) damages for lost
profits or opportunity; or (iii) damages for pain and suffering.
43. FDIC, Statement of Policy Regarding Treatment of Security Interests After
Appointment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as Conservator or
Receiver, 58 Fed. Reg. 16833 (Mar. 31, 1993).
44. See, e.g., First Empire Bank v. FDIC, 572 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1978). See also
Bank One, Texas, N.A. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 878 F. Supp. 943 (N.D.
Tex. 1995) (holding that the FDIC as receiver was liable for contingent claims so long
as those claims arise before insolvency and did not rely upon new contractual
obligations created after insolvency).
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The law is not settled as to whether the "provability"
doctrine continues to apply in FDIC receiverships and
conservatorships, or whether it was preempted by the specific
standards of § 1821(e). The influential Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit has reasoned that the concept that an
obligation must have become absolute by the time of insolvency
had clearly weakened even before FIRREA's adoption and it did
not survive the specification of claims recoverable upon
repudiation in § 1821(e)(3). The court went on to explain that
even before FIRREA, creditors could recover for a receiver's
breach of a standby letter of credit which is, by its nature,
41contingent as to the obligation to pay.
These issues are of particular importance regarding secured
stand-by letters of credit where the triggering event has not
occurred at the time of the insolvency and the FDIC demands
return of the collateral in the receivership.
4. Bank Operating Subsidiaries and Financial Subsidiaries
It is well settled that bank holding companies and financial
holding companies which become insolvent are subject to the
procedures provided under the Bankruptcy Code and clearly
banks are subject to the federal insolvency regime including the
conservatorship and receivership rules under FIRREA. But what
about state chartered corporations owned by banks? There are
three categories of subsidiaries of banks: bank operating
subsidiaries, financial subsidiaries, and statutory subsidiaries. An
operating subsidiary engages in activities which "are part of, or
incidental to, the business of banking," such as mortgage lending.46
A financial subsidiary's activities are those "that are financial in
nature or incidental to a financial activity," such as underwriting
and dealing in securities.47 A statutory subsidiary is one especially
45. Nashville Loading Co., et. al. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 59 F.3d 236 (D.C.
Cir. 1995).
46. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER'S
HANDBOOK, RELATED ORGANIZATIONS 7 (2004).
47. Id. at 10.
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authorized by statute for specific purposes, such as a small business
48investment company or a bank service corporation.
While there is no definitive case or clearly controlling
statute, the generally accepted assumption is that an operating
subsidiary or "bank op sub" is not subject to the bankruptcy
regime but is subject to conservatorship and receivership
procedures under the FIRREA scheme along with its parent bank
since both are in the "business of banking." The reasoning is that
bankruptcy law is not the exclusive mechanism for deal with
insolvent institutions and there are alternate provisions under
various federal and state regulatory schemes which provide for
insolvency procedures for institutions engaged in certain lines of
business.49 Indicative as to what is the "business of banking" are
the examples found in the National Bank Act (NBA) and the
pronouncements of the Comptroller of the Currency regarding
national banks although these are not definitive or necessarily
exhaustive on the issue since the Comptroller's Office only
regulates national banks.50
Numerous cases have studied the relationship of national
banks and their operating subsidiaries; one of the most recent and
important decisions was from the United States Supreme Court in
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.5' In Watters, the Court noted:
[t]his Court has never held that the [National Bank
Act]'s preemptive reach extends only to a national
bank itself; instead, the Court has focused on the
exercise of a national bank's powers, not on its
corporate structure in analyzing whether state law
hampers the federally permitted activities of a
national bank. And the Court has treated operating
subsidiaries, as equivalent to national banks with
48. Id. at 14-18.
49. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 8 (1977) reprinted in U.S.C.A.N.N. 5963, 5969; S.
REP. No. 95-989, at 31 (1978), reprinted in U.S.C.A.N.N. 5787, 5817. These reports
are the legislative history for The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and contain
discussions of Section 109 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
50. The bank powers under the National Bank Act are codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. A more readily accessible statement of those powers
appears in 12 C.F.R. § 7 (2009).
51. 550 U.S. 1 (2007).
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respect to powers exercised under federal law
(except where federal law provides otherwise). 2
The Court also stated
[n]otably, when Congress amended the NBA to
provide that operating subsidiaries may "engag[e]
solely in activities that national banks are permitted
to engage in directly" [12 U.S.C. § 24a(g)(3)(A)], it
did so in an Act [Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
(GLBA)] providing that other affiliates, authorized
to engage in nonbanking financial activities, e.g.,
securities and insurance, are subject to state
regulation in connection with those activities. 3
Since national bank affiliates other than operating
subsidiaries are not necessarily considered to be engaged in the
business of banking, does it follow that financial subsidiaries
authorized by Gramm-Leach-Bliley would be excluded from the
FIRREA insolvency scheme?
In distinguishing between these two categories of bank
subsidiaries, the Comptroller of the Currency states that "(a)n
operating subsidiary is a corporation, LLC, or similar entity that
engages in activities that are part of, or incidental to, the business
of banking as determined by the OCC or other statutory
authority" and controlled by a bank 4 On the other hand the
Comptroller describes a financial subsidiary as "any company that
is controlled by one or more insured depository institutions, other
than a subsidiary that is an operating subsidiary or statutory
subsidiary that engages in activities that are financial in nature or
incidental to a financial activity."55
The Office of the Comptroller of Currency views the
operating subsidiaries and the bank as a single economic entity for
supervisory purposes. The results of operating subsidiaries are
52. Id. at 5 (citations omitted).
53. Id. at 20.
54. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 46, at 7.
55. Id. at 10.
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consolidated with those of the bank for applying such restrictions
as maximum lending limits, and the operating subsidiaries are
combined with the bank for regulatory restrictions such as 23A
and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act56 and the implementing rule of
Regulation W.7 On the other hand, financial subsidiaries are not
considered to be subsidiaries of the bank for 23A, 23B and
Regulation W and therefore financial subsidiaries are generally
limited in the amount and conditions of borrowings and other
transactions with the bank.58
Likewise, in the anti-tying provisions of the Bank Holding
Company Act59 and the Federal Reserve's Regulation Y60
generally treat a financial subsidiary of a bank as a subsidiary of
61the holding company and not a subsidiary of the bank.
Furthermore, Gramm-Leach-Bliley recognized that regulators
other than bank regulators may functionally regulate certain
activities conducted by financial subsidiaries or banks.62
While operating subsidiaries are generally viewed as
functional parts of the bank and thus under the bank insolvency
regime, the connection of financial subsidiaries is not so close to
the "business of banking" as to assume that they are necessarily
63
outside the regular federal bankruptcy process. In a case decided
56. 12 U.S.C. § 371c (2006); 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1(2006).
57. 12 C.F.R. § 223 (2009).
58. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(e)(2) (2006).
59. 12 U.S.C. § 1971-78 (2006).
60. 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.01 to 225.200 (2009).
61. See 12 U.S.C. § 1971 (providing that a financial subsidiary is deemed to be a
bank holding company subsidiary and not a bank subsidiary for the purposes of tying
arrangements).
62. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 1843(k), 1844(c)(4) (2007); see also Lissa L. Broome
and Jerry W. Markham, Banking and Insurance: Before and After the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, 25 J. CORP. L. 723 (2000).
63. While the analysis here has focused on the powers of national banks, the
powers of banks in the United States are, as a general matter, determined by their
chartering authority. Thus, national bank powers are determined by the federal
government and state chartered bank powers are determined by the various state
authorities. As such, the general powers of banks vary widely. For example, as
opposed to the federal scheme hereinbefore described, North Carolina banking law
gives broad powers to banks chartered under its statutory scheme. N.C. GEN. STAT. §
53-43 provides that banks chartered under North Carolina law shall have certain
enumerated powers "(i)n addition to the powers conferred by law upon private
corporations." Consequently, under North Carolina laws, its chartered banks can
exercise any general corporate powers plus banking powers. As regards insolvency
regimes, North Carolina law provides a scheme for dissolution and liquidation of
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prior to the GLBA and therefore not involving a financial
subsidiary, however,, the Fourth Circuit decided that a bankruptcy
court could not enjoin the RTC in a FIRREA receivership (acting
as the FDIC would act now for banks) from replacing the board of
directors of the insolvent thrift's subsidiary land development
company, permitting the new board of the subsidiary to withdraw
its petition in bankruptcy. 64 The court's reasoning was that the
comprehensive scheme of FIRREA allowed the RTC full rein
over the assets of an insolvent thrift, including its ownership
interest in subsidiaries, along with the specific anti-injunctive
language found in § 18210) regarding receivers that the court said
superseded the general statutory language of the Bankruptcy Code
and thus the power of the bankruptcy courts in such regards. If
the logic of the Fourth Circuit prevails, it would seem that public
policy and statutory construction would favor allowing a bank
receiver, in its discretion, to decide whether it would administer
the financial subsidiary in the bank receivership, or whether it
would permit the financial subsidiary to be subject to bankruptcy
proceedings.
banks in Section 53-18 et. seq. These state provisions are not inconsistent with
federal law; they are alternative; alternative powers permitted by chartering
authorities under the dual banking system, and alternative insolvency mechanisms.
A bank being formed in North Carolina, as in other states, may elect to be chartered
under federal law or under state law. If it elects to be chartered under state law, it
may elect to be insured under the FDIC or not to be so insured. If it elects not to be
so insured, the state insolvency scheme is the one applicable. On the other hand, if it
elects to have it deposits insured by the FDIC, although the state chartering authority
retains the authority to declare a bank insolvent, in almost all cases the state will
request the FDIC to act as the receiver in the event of an insolvency. In such event,
the FDIC uses its receivership rules regardless of the bank's chartering authority (see
12 U.S.C. §1821(c) (2006)). Therefore, regardless of the 'business of banking'
analysis as described hereinbefore in distinguishing FIRREA and bankruptcy
insolvencies, if the failed institution is an insured bank, as opposed to a subsidiary of
the insured bank, it seems clear that the FIRREA process will apply to its insolvency.
Similarly, since financial subsidiaries can only exist if they are controlled by one or
more insured depository institutions, should they by their organization structure be
subject to the FDIC receivership procedures?
64. In re Landmark Land Co. of Okla., Inc., Landmark Land Co. of Carolina,
Inc., v. Resolution Trust Corp., 973 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1992).
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V. DRAFTING LOAN MODIFICATIONS
Although there is no required format, style, or even a
generally accepted practice, loan modifications customarily take
the form of an amendment, modification, waiver, forbearance or
amendment and restatement. The forbearance, or reservation of
rights, is normally a vehicle used to maintain the status quo to see
if a substantive modification can be negotiated without the lender
waiving its rights regarding an event of default. The document(s)
modified may be the note, loan agreement, or any ancillary or
collateral documents. In fact, it is not uncommon to see more than
one form used regarding the same document (e.g., the Third
Modification of the Fifth Amendment Loan Agreement). As a
matter of style, however, and in trying to keep the "four corners of
the agreement" in one document, and making the job or the fact
finder in a dispute more predictable, many practitioners prefer to
use an amendment and restatement whenever possible. Most
practitioners also prefer agreements for a forbearance or
reservation of rights rather than "temporary waiver" agreements
because of the perceived increased risk of estoppel in temporary
waivers and the danger of potential misuse or misdescription of
temporary waivers by borrowers to their other creditors or equity
holders.
While the process of documenting loan modifications, like
documenting original credit extensions, has many variations and
dynamics, there are several characteristics that are especially
desirable when the bank identifies the underlying credit as
problematic. For example, grace periods should be reduced or
eliminated. The modifications should include an acknowledgment
of the validity and amount of the debt and that the borrower has
no defenses, or offsets against the debt. To the extent any adverse
claims have been or may be asserted against the lender, there
should be a waiver of those claims. If an event of default has
occurred, or if the borrower has been declared in default, that
occurrence should be specifically identified and the borrower
should represent that there are no other events of default or
defaults, and that no facts or circumstances exist which, with the
passage of time, would constitute an event of default or default.
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The borrower should represent that there is no event of default or
default in any other material contract or obligation and that the
proposed modification would not constitute an event of default or
default under those contracts or obligations. To the extent there is
any exception to these representations, they should be identified
and evaluated.
Examples of typical loan modification provisions follow in
the Appendix.
VI. CONCLUSION
Loan modifications naturally arise when expectations
regarding a credit relationship or the business or legal
environments are not fulfilled. Loan modifications tend to be the
most troublesome when the failure of the expectations is severe or
the circumstances leading to it are new or unfamiliar.
The customary goal of loan agreements is to establish and
document the framework of a credit relationship which is
beneficial to both the borrower and the lender. In turbulent times
that goal is not always achievable. The prospects of success are
heightened, however, when each side understands what is a
reasonably achievable goal and what conduct is lawful and
acceptable in the marketplace in achieving a modified goal. The
purpose of this article has been to explore some of the topics
which impact a modification of the original goals of the
stakeholders. The expectation is that an understanding of these
topics may establish some foundation for the respective parties to
consider what may be achievable by their efforts, and what the
path might look like on the way to establishing and documenting
those modified goals.
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APPENDIX
Examples of Provisions which Tend to be Found in Loan
Modifications:
Representations and Warranties of Borrower. Borrower
hereby represents and warrants that: (a) it has the requisite power
and authority to execute, deliver and perform this Agreement and
any related documents; (b) it is duly authorized to, and has been
authorized by all necessary action, to execute, deliver and perform
this Agreement and any related documents; (c) it has no claims,
counterclaims, offsets, or defenses to the Loan Documents and the
performance of its obligations thereunder; (d) the representations
and warranties contained in the Loan Documents are, subject to
the limitations set forth therein, true and correct in all material
respects on and as of the date hereof as though made on and as of
such date (except for those which expressly relate to an earlier
date and except to the extent that such representations and
warranties relate to the Existing Events of Default); (e) this
Agreement does not violate any law, rule, regulation, contract or
agreement otherwise enforceable by or against it; (f) other than
the Acknowledged Events of Default, no default or event of
default exists under the Loan Documents on and as of the date
hereof and (g) that the amount owing to Lender as of close of
business on , is $ in principal and
$ in interest, all plus fees, costs, expenses and other
charges.
Representations and Warranties of the Guarantor. The
Guarantor hereby represents and warrants that it: (a) has had the
opportunity to obtain the assistance of legal counsel in carefully
reviewing, discussing and considering all terms of this Agreement;
(b) executes this Agreement as a free and voluntary act, without
any duress, coercion or undue influence exerted by or on behalf of
any other party; (c) has full and complete authorization and power
to execute this Agreement in the capacities herein stated, and that
this Agreement does not violate any law, rule, regulation, contract
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or agreement otherwise enforceable by or against it, and (d) it has
no claims, counterclaims, offsets or defenses to the Guaranty.
Acknowledgment of Guarantor. The Guarantor
acknowledges and consents to all of the terms and conditions of
this Agreement and agrees that this Agreement and all documents
executed in connection herewith do not operate to reduce or
discharge the Guarantor's obligations under the Guaranty, or any
other Loan Document.
Waiver and Release. Each of Borrower and the Guarantor
waives any duty or obligation of the Lender to proceed to collect
payment or to commence any actions against or to resort to any
security or to offset any balance or any account of any person,
including each of them, despite any notice or request of any of
them to do so. Included in such waiver is any rights to marshalling,
any rights under N.C.G.S. § 26.7, any right to require Lender to
file any claims or proofs of claims in any insolvency proceeding,
any right to stay of execution, co-debtor stay or any other stay,
restraint or any requirement that the Lender proceed to collect the
obligations referenced herein in any particular manner, fashion,
order or priority other than as Lender may determine in good
faith. Each of Borrower and the Guarantor hereby releases the
Lender and its officers, employees, representatives, agents,
attorneys and directors from any and all actions, causes of action,
claims, demands, damages and liabilities of whatever kind or
nature, in law or in equity, now known or unknown, suspected or
unsuspected and any right or privilege which might be asserted or
claimed by virtue of any course of conduct, prior dealings or
similar allegations regarding in any manner the loans and
transactions referenced herein arising on or before the date of this
Agreement.
Liens. Each of Borrower and the Guarantor hereby affirms
the liens and security interests created and granted in the Loan
Documents and agrees that this Agreement shall in no manner
adversely effect or impair such liens and security interests.
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No Other Changes. Except as expressly modified in this
Agreement, the terms, provisions and conditions of the Loan
Documents Loan Documents shall remain unchanged and shall
continue in full force and effect.

